DETERMINANTS OF RESTRUCTURED FARM LOAN PERFORMANCE by Pederson, Glenn D. et al.
SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS  DECEMBER  1991
DETERMINANTS  OF RESTRUCTURED  FARM  LOAN
PERFORMANCE
Glenn Pederson, Ananth Rao, and Michael Boehlje
Abstract  The FCB developed its strategy for managing the
nonaccrual  loan  problem during  the  latter part of
A probabilistic model is applied to cross-sectional  1986.  emphasis  of the  recovery  plan  was to
data to identify determinants of post-restructure per-  negotiate  loan  restructuring  arrangements  that
formance of Federal Land Bank loans. The results  wold  aiie  te economic benefits  to the bank
indicate  that restructured  loans  were  sensitive  to  wile ampig to  control  the overall  credit risk
factors  that  determine  thwhile  attempting  to control  the  overall credit risk
factors  that determine  the debt repayment  burden  and legal  exposure.  Rapid restructuring  of nonac-
and*threpament  t  of te  re  ured  far  and legal exposure.  Rapid restructuring  of nonac--
and the repayment ability of the restructured  farm and the repayment  ability of the restructured  farm  crual loans was a major element of the overall plan
operations.  Loan performance  is found  to be rela-
tively more sensitive to the levels of the post-restruc-  s  e  rioratio  a  i  aiaa
ture interest rate and cash farm income than to the
financial  structure and leverage position of the re-  One of the key issues of restructuring  is the uncer-
structured farm. The relationships between the post-  tain future performance of loans that are restructured
restructure interest rate, cash farm income level, and  for viability.2 Early estimates by FCB internal audi-
the probability of loan performance  are illustrated.  tors and special credit personnel indicated the exist-
ence  of widely  disparate  opinions  about  the
Key words:  restructuredfarm loans, performance,  percentage of restructured loans that were expected
Federal Land Bank  to perform. It is not uncommon to find such differing
opinions on viability of restructured farm operations
The Farm  Credit Banks  of St.  Paul (F  , like  and it raises the two research questions underlying
The Farm Credit  Banks  of St. Paul  (FCB),  like many  other Farm Credit District ba  Cks  B  experienced  this paper.  First, what are the major determinants of
many other Farm Credit District banks, experienced  restcturedfarm loanperformanceintheshortrun?
a  significant  deterioration  in  loan  quality  during  restructuredfarmloanperformanceintheshortrun?
1983-1986.  Unn  restructured,  nonaccrual  loan  vol  Second, can estimates of the probabilities of nonper-
formance be derived and used to evaluate and guide
ume stood at $1,328  million in the Seventh District  formancebe derived and used to evaluate and guide
by  the end  of  1986.  That represented  about  16.9  therestructuringprocess?  Thecorrespondingob-
percent of gross  loan volume.  Federal Land Bank  jective  of  this  paper  was  to  conduct  an  ex post
(FLB) loans accounted for 84.7 percent of the total  analysis to identify those determinants and evaluate
nonaccruing farm loan volume at the FCB. In addi-  their influence onthe short-run, post-restructure per-
tion,  FLB  delinquencies  were  reported  to  be  6.1  formance of loans  at the FCB. The focus on short-
percent of accruing FLB loan volume ($4.69 billion)  run  loan  performance  gives  high  priority  to
onDecember31,1986.'  Uncertaintyabout farm real  identifying  situations  where  restructuring  efforts
estate  values,  the continuing  deterioration  of loan  would  be  inadequate  to  significantly  improve  the
collateral values, and the build-up of acquired prop-  likelihood of repayment. For example, restructuring
erty inventories through deedback  and foreclosure  of a borrower's debt obligations may provide only
further compounded the FCB's problems. The bank  minor financial relief such that income in the next
was also projecting  that it would be forced to con-  year is inadequate to make the new debt payments.
tinue moving a large number of loans to nonaccrual  With  this  information  the FCB  could redirect  its
status during  1987.  efforts to  restructure more extensively,  or monitor
Delinquent loans include those with payments over 30 days past due. Nonaccruals are typically loans that stop accruing
interest after they are 90 days past due. Delinquencies of the FLB and nonaccruals of the FCB are distinct categories of loan volume.
2The FCB defines viable farm units as those which generate sufficient income on an annual basis to pay all operating, family
living, and interest expenses and maintain capital replacement. A viable unit generally has a good net worth position.
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39those loans more closely, or explore various nonre-  tively.  In contrast with these previous studies, this
structure alternatives.  paper extends the probabilistic model to the problem
Analysis of the determinants  of restructured loan  of analyzing the performance  of restructured, non-
performance  at the microeconomic  level  is impor-  accrual borrowers.
tant  for  several  reasons.  First,  the  viability  of  a  In binomial logit analysis, it is assumed that there
restructured loan is important to the survivability of  is an underlying response variable Y*i defined by the
farming operations  that have participated in a loan  regression relationship
restructuring  program.  For example,  since the re-  (1)  y: = PTX  +
structured  interest  rate may  affect farm  cash flow structured  interest  rate  may affect farm  cash flow  where Xi are the independent variables, u is the error and profitability,  it  is  important  for  the lender  to  werm,  iarthe  vetr of coefiients,  a  indicates
know  if the  post-restructure  interest  rate  signifi-  t  the  ct  coeff, is unobservable.  Used
cantly  influences  the  performance  of  individuals  unobsr  Used
loans and the loan portfolio.  Second, identification  in its place is the dummy variable,  defined by
and quantification of the factors that lead to success- 
ful loan restructuring  would  be  useful  in guiding  Y=  f the restructured loan does not perform
future borrower-lendernegotiations involved inloan  (i.e., if Y  >  0)
restructuring.
=  0 if the restructured  loan does perform
METHOD OF ANALYSIS  (i.e., if  <  ).
The  dependent  variable  in an  analysis  of loan
performance is binary (i.e., the scheduled payment  In this formulation  pTXi is E(Y*' I  Xi).
on the loan is or is not made).  Gessner et al. have  From equations (1) and (2),
analyzed  the  theoretical  and  empirical  aspects  of  (3)  Prob (Y  = 1) = P
estimating models with binary dependent variables.  = Prob (u  > -pTXi)
They  observe  that each of the classification  tech-  =  1 - F(-pTX,)
niques  (e.g.,  linear  discriminant  analysis,  binary
probit,  ordinary least squares  (OLS)  and quadratic probit,  ordinary least squares  (OLS), and quadratic  where F is the cumulative distribution for u. In this
discriminant  analysis)  has a set  of underlying  as-  case the observed values of Y are the realizations of
sumptions  that  must not be  violated  by  the  data.  a boal  rocess  th  rs  ve  b 
Linear discriminant analysis (LDA)  can be used to  a  bnomial process with probabilities given by equa- ein  ear  discriminant analysis  (LD)  can be  used  tot  tion (3), which vary from trial to trial (depending on model binary  variables,  but one must assume  that  the Xi).  Hence, the likelihood function is the Xi). Hence, the likelihood function is the predictor variables  are distributed multi-variate
normal, which frequently does not hold for measures  T  T
such  as  financial  ratios.  LDA  has  the  additional  (4)  L  (  =  F  X)  [  - F(  X,)]
disadvantage that the probabilities of events must be  i = 0  yi = 1
constrained to the interval (0,1). Although there are
no multivariate  distributional  assumptions  for  the  Since the cumulative distribution of ui is assumed to
predictors underlying logit and probit analysis, strict  be logistic, it follows that
error term distributional assumptions underlie both  F(-pTX ,)  exp  (-  TX )  1
techniques  (Maddala). The logit model requires the  + exp (- TXi)  + exp ( TXi)
assumption of a skewed Weibull or Gumbel distri-
bution of the error term, as compared to the symmet-  Therefore,  1 - F(-ITXi) = P1
ric normal  distribution for probit and OLS. Due to
the closed form structure, logit is preferred to probit  exp (
for analytical convenience.  (5) 
Recent studies have used probit or logit methods  [1 + exp (3TXi)]
to analyze  the problem of classifying borrowers  as
good  or poor  credit  risks.  Lufburrow  et  al.  used  I  this case, there is a closed-form  expression for F
probit  regression  in  their  analysis  of  Production  (because it does not involve explicit integrals)  and
Credit Association loans.  Fiske et al. employed  lo-  Pi can be computed. Rearrangement of equation (3)
gistic regression  to model  factors  influencing  cur-  gives
rentness  of debt  payment  among  Ohio  farmers.
Mortensen et al. and Miller and LaDue used logistic  (6)  Ln  Pi  ]  (TXi
regression  to predict  probability of loan default of  (1-  Pi)
farmers  in  North  Dakota  and  New  York,  respec-
40The dependent  variable in this application of the  Financial Variables
regression  equation is simply  the logarithm  of the  Financial variables were expressed in relative in-
odds that the restructured loan will not perform.  A  dex form. These indices were computed as the 1988
restructured  loan is not performing if the borrower  (post-restructure)  values divided by the correspond-
failed  to make  interest and/or scheduled  principal  ing geometric means of the 1984-1987 (pre-restruc-
payments under the terms of the restructure arrange-  ture) values. For example, the debt/asset index (DA)
ment. One of the advantages of the logistic approach  is equal to the debt/asset ratio in 1988 divided by the
is that an estimate for the critical point of explana-  geometric mean of the debt/asset ratio during 1984-
tory variable i can be derived by solving the model  1987.  This  index  measure  approach  was  used  to
with  PTXi=O  and all  other variables  at their mean  measure the influence of changes in these financial
values. The critical point for variable i is the value  variables from the pre-restructure period to the post-
at which this variable has the greatest impact on the  restructure  period on the likelihood of post-restruc-
conditional probability of nonperformance.  ture loan performance.  An index value greater than
1.0 indicates that an increase occurred in the finan-
DATA  cial measure during  1988 compared with the mean
Stratified  random  sampling  was  used  to  select  of the previous years. Although numerous financial
FLB  borrower  credit  files  in  southern  Minnesota  variables were computed, only those that were sig-
based  on  business-view  principal  of the borrower  nificant predictors of loan performance are reviewed
accounts.  The business-view  principal refers to the  here.
FCB's book value of the loan and includes outstand-  Several measures  of the change  in farm earnings
ing principal  and accrued interest.  FCB employees  were identified as potential predictors  of loan per-
and persons contracted to the FCB collected  infor-  formance:  the rate of return on farm assets (ROA),
mation from individual credit files of borrowers for  gross  cash farm income (GCFI), net cash farm in-
several years  prior to debt resolution (1984-1986),  come,  and  net  farm  income  (accrual).  The  ROA
the year debt was restructured  (1987), and the year  measure  (net cash farm  income  plus interest  paid
following the restructuring action (1988). Individual  divided  by total  assets)  is  easily  converted  to  an
case data were collected from a total of 85 restruc-  index  of profit  performance.  However,  the  ROA
tured  borrower  files.  Three  general  categories  of  index is a function of changes in both farm earnings
variables  were  identified  for  analysis:  financial,  and  asset  values.  Land  values  had  fallen  sharply
nonfinancial,  and  restructure  variables.  Summary  during 1982-1987 (Schwab and Raup) which would
statistics  for some  of the identified  variables  are  tend to raise ROA measures  in the pre-restructure
reported in Table 1. Since parameter estimates were  period even though farm earnings may have deterio-
found to be sensitive to missing values, only the 44  rated.  The rise  in land values  during  1988 would
cases with complete information  were used in the  have the opposite effect on ROA. Additionally, the
analysis.4 FLB had previously used benchmark farms to gauge
changing  land values.  These benchmarks  may not
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Predictors of Post-Restructure  Performance
Interquartile Range
Standard  25th  75th
Variable  Mean  Deviation  Median  Percentile  Percentile  Minimum  Maximum
DA (index)a  .85  .22  .83  .78  .98  .33  1.31
DSI (index)
b 1.04  .22  .99  .93  1.08  .69  1.78
GCFI  (index)c  1.05  .27  1.05  1.0  1.1  .22  1.78
INT (%)d  9.18  1.10  9.  8.  9.76  8.00  12.75
a Debt to asset index
b  Debt structure index
c  Gross cash farm  income
d Post-restructure interest rate
3The "odds" that the restructured loan would not perform relates to the ratio of the probability that the loan would not perform
to the probability  that the loan would perform.
4The use of only complete case data does not introduce bias into the empirical analysis.  Summary statistics for the complete
and incomplete cases were compared on all variables where data was available and found to be nearly identical.
41have accurately reflected changes in the land values  structured  operators.  Similarly,  the 75th percentile
of individual  farms. In  1987, appraisals were  done  statistic  is  0.98.  This  indicates  that  about  three-
by the FCB to establish more accurate asset values  fourths  of the sample  borrowers  were  in post-re-
as part of the restructuring  effort.  Since changing  structure debt positions which had been reduced by
farm earnings and asset values are combined into a  2 percent or more from the debt/asset positions they
single  ROA  index  measure,  interpretation  of  the  carried prior to restructuring.
effect on loan performance becomes difficult. Con-  A deficiency of the DA index is that it does not
sequently,  the ROA index  was rejected in favor of  indicate if the maturity of debt has been significantly
separate indicators  of farm earnings and asset val-  altered  by  restructuring.  The  debt structure  index
ues.  (DSI) is a measure of the relationship between non-
Gross  cash farm income  (GCFI) was found to be  current  liabilities  and  noncurrent  assets  (Maz-
the measure of farm  earnings  which was the best  zocco). 5 Computationally,
predictor of loan performance. In addition, the GCFI
captures  the effect of changes  in economic  condi-  DSI = [(TL-CL)/TL] / [(TA-CA)/TA]
tions on farm financial performance during the post-
restructure  period.  While  GCFI  is  an  annual  where TL is total liabilities, CL is current liabilities,
measure,  the  GCFI  index  reported  in  Table  1 is  TA is total assets and CA is current assets. The DSI
expressed as the ratio of the 1988 (post-restructure)  is an indicator of potential liquidity problems arising
cash  income  to  the mean  of the  1984-1987  cash  from the combined effects of financial leverage and
income series.  The mean  GCFI index value (1.05)  differences  between the timing  of maturities  of li-
indicates  that there was a 5 percent  increase in the  abilities  and  the rates  at  which noncurrent  assets
average  level of cash  incomes  during  1988,  even  contribute  to cash flow.6 The DSI index was com-
though that was a drought  year. An increase in the  puted by  dividing  the post-restructure  DSI by the
GCFI index is expected to result in a greater capacity  mean  pre-restructure  DSI.  The result  is a relative
to repay debt in the post-restructure period. Accord-  index measure which exceeds  1.0 when the financial
ing  to  the  interquartile  range  statistics,  about  75  structure of the farm business  has been  altered to-
percent  of the restructured  farms  experienced  the  ward  proportionately  greater  long-term  liabilities
same level or higher gross cash farm income during  through debt restructuring.  The mean DSI index is
1988  when compared  with the mean of the pre-re-  1.04  and the estimated  standard  deviation  is 0.22.
structure years.  The 4 percent  increase  in the average DSI  value is
Debt/asset  (DA)  ratios  were  computed  (as total  expected  to increase the ability of the average farm
farm liabilities divided by total farm assets) and the  o make repayment on the restructured loan.
ratios  were  converted  to index measures.  The DA
index measure of changes in financial leverage po-  Restructure Variables
sition is also affected  by changes in asset values.  In  Loan restructuring is a process during which lend-
this instance, however,  these changes do not create  ers may consider a number of additional  financial
an interpretation problem. Prior to 1987, the decline  parameters  of the problem.  The factors which must
inasset values would tend to raise the pre-restructure  be considered in the restructure  versus foreclosure
leverage position if debt was not paid off at a com-  decision are now dictated under the  1987 Agricul-
mensurate  rate.  Restructuring  typically  involved a  tural Credit Act. Since the St. Paul-FCB conducted
debt reduction,  and the  DA ratio  would  have  de-  most of its  1987 restructuring  activity prior to pas-
creased.  The mean DA index should be less than 1.0  sage of the 1987 Act, we identified restructure vari-
and indicate a lower leverage position in the post-re-  ables that were logically related to the performance
structure period.  The implication of this lower debt  of these loans. Three of those variables were the loan
burden is that the probability  of loan repayment  is  penetration  ratio (FLB debtnet realizable  value of
improved.  The  sample  mean  DA  index  was  esti-  assets held by the FLB as collateral) expressed as an
mated to be 0.85, which implies a 15 percent average  index measure, the dollar amount of borrower FLB
reduction occurred  in the relative  debt load of re-  debt  (outstanding  principal  plus  accrued  interest)
5Note that the ratio of noncurrent liabilities to noncurrent assets is the product of the DA ratio and the debt structure index, i.e.,
(TL-CL)/(TA-CA) = DA *  DSI. Both the overall  leverage position of the borrower and the relative maturities of assets and
liabilities are captured in the DSI ratio.
6To illustrate, consider two firms, each with a DSI of one, and identical values of total assets. Assume, firm A has a DA ratio of
0.3, while firm B has a DA ratio of 0.9. If all other factors are equal, firm B will require annually three times more cash than firm A
to reduce term debt. Firm B's likelihood of experiencing  liquidity problems is magnified by its financial leverage.
42after restructuring,  and the post-restructure  interest  is to omit one of the collinear variables  (Kennedy,
rate  (in percent).  Neither the loan penetration ratio  p.  151). The premise behind this approach is that the
nor the amount of outstanding debt were found to be  true  coefficient  of  the dropped variable  would be
strongly  related  to  loan  performance  and  are  not  zero because of a high degree of linear dependence.
discussed further.  In such a case, the estimated coefficients would not
The post-restructure  interest rate (INT) is the con-  be seriously biased by dropping the redundant vari-
tractual  interest  rate charged by  the FLB after re-  able,  and the efficiency of the parameter estimates
structuring  the loan.  The  average  interest  rate on  improves.  A trade-off necessarily  occurs  between
restructured  loans in the sample was 9.18  percent.  gain in efficiency and acceptable levels of bias in the
These post-restructure interest rates ranged from 8.0  estimates. While multi-collinearity  would not result
to  12.75  percent.  Comparison  of  these rates  with  in biased estimates,  greater efficiency  was the pre-
rates on accruing FLB  loans indicated  that signifi-  ferred outcome in the restructure  analysis due to the
cant rate reductions frequently occurred on restruc-  study's  focus on significant  predictors  of nonper-
tured  loans.  The  restructure  interest  rate  was  formance. Restructured borrower cases were pooled
typically set as a 3-year fixed rate. At the end of the  for a single analysis and LIMDEP software was used
fixed-rate contract the interest rate is to be renegoti-  for model estimation.  The criteria for choosing the
ated  with the FLB.  Consequently,  loans that were  appropriate model were the pseudo-R2 statistic, the
restructured  in early  1987 were  due for an interest  log-likelihood ratio, the Chi-square statistic, asymp-
rate review/adjustment beginning in early 1990. It is  totic-t values, and correct prediction percentages.
expected  that a lower post-restructure  interest rate  Estimated parameters of the restructured-perform-
increases  the probability  that the borrower would  ing (RP) equation were normalized  to zero for the
perform on the loan.  purpose of interpretation. The restructured-nonper-
forming  (RNP)  model  coefficients  are  the  prob-
Nonfinancial Variables  abilities that restructured loans  would not perform
Initially, numerous characteristics of the borrower  relative to the outcome that those loans would per-
and  the  borrower's  business  were  considered  as  form. Results in Table 2 indicate the variables that
potential  determinants  of ability or willingness  to  were found to be significant  in explaining why re-
repay the restructured loan. However, the theoretical  structured loans did not perform. Nonfinancial vari-
justification for including them in the model was not  ables were not significant and were excluded from
strong. The fact that they were not important predic-  the final  model. The  post-restructure  interest rate
tors was borne out by the lack of significant statisti-  (INT) was the most highly significant  predictor of
cal relationships with the loan performance variable  nonperformance and the coefficient has the expected
and problems of intercorrelation between those vari-  positive sign. The higher the interest rate, the higher
ables. The following variables were considered: the
Table 2.  Restructured Loan  Nonperformance farmer's age, how long the farmer had been borrow-  Model  Results with  RP as the Base
ing  from the FLB, the size  of farm  (total  assets),
annual nonfarm  income, a dummy variable  for co-  Estimated  Significance
operativeness of the borrower with the FLB in seek-  Variable  Coefficient  T-statistic  Level
ing a compromise on the debt, the FLB's assessment  INT (%)a  1.11435  2.14  0.0321
of the borrower's business management ability, and  DSI  (index)b  -8.49685  -1.64  0.1004
the  value  of the  borrower's  land  assets  in  1988  GCFI  (index)c -6.12892  -1.84  0.0656
divided by the value in  1987.  DA (index)d  3.17294  1.45  0.1472
LOAN NONPERFORMANCE  ANALYSIS  Log Likelihood  ratio  17.904
Multi-collinearity  among the  variables was  ana-  Chi-squared  significance  level (3)  =  .00046
lyzed using the method of singular value decompo-  Pseudo-R2 .47
sition (Belsley,  Kuh, and Welsch).7 The procedure  aPost-restructure  interest rate.
revealed that significant collinearity existed among  b Deb  structure index.
c Gross cash farm income.
variables  in  the  initial  data  set.  One  acceptable  d Debt/asset ratio.
method of correcting the multi-collinearity problem
7  SVD is  a procedure for diagnosing the presence  of multi-collinearity  among the independent variables. The procedure uses
two criteria:  a  singular value with a  high condition index (30 or above) associated with a high variable decomposition proportion
(0.5 or above) for two or more estimated regression coefficients. These two criteria jointly indicated which variables are exhibiting
near dependency. Those variables were dropped from the analysis.
43are the odds that the restructured  loan would  not  A total of 36 cases was used to estimate the equa-
perform.  tion (of which 28 cases were performing  loans and
The DSI index variable carried the expected nega-  8  were nonperforming loans). When applied  to the
tive sign and the coefficient  is significant at the  10  data set, the estimated equation correctly  classified
percent level. The higher the DSI index, the lower  93 percent of restructured  loans in the restructured
the odds that restructured loans would not perform.  performing loan (RP) category. The model also cor-
The  general  interpretation  of this model  result is  rectly  identified  75  percent  of the nonperforming
made in two parts. First, a higher DSI ratio reflects  restructured  loans  (RNP).  Total  correct  classifica-
an improvement  in farm  financial structure  (other  tion of loans was  89 percent.  The model was vali-
factors held constant). Similarly, a higher DSI index  dated using a  15 percent holdout sample (8 cases).
(DSI post-restructure  ratio/DSI  pre-restructure  ra-  Parameter estimates performed reasonably well in
tio) also reflects  an improvement  in farm financial  the holdout sample with a total correct classification
structure. More specifically, a higher DSI ratio indi-  of 71  percent.  The  model  was  also  evaluated  by
cates that the proportion  of long-term liabilities  in  computing  the probabilities  of nonperformance  at
the capital structure  is higher,  while a higher DSI  t  mn  the  mo  variables. Theprobabilitythat
index indicates  that the p  structure  the  post-average  restructure  proporloanwouldnotperformwas
of long-term liabilities  in the capital  structure has  estimated  to  be  9  percent.  This  fell  in  the  5-10
increased relative to the pre-restructure  proportion.  percent  range  of nonperformance  anticipated  by
Second, the consequence of an increase in the DSI  FCB credit personnel.
index was a reduction  in the likelihood of a future
liquidity problem. Debt maturities were restructured  Marginal Probabilities
so that the demands  on farm cash flow are propor-
tionately lower and more consistent with  the level  The  probability  of nonperformance  at  different
of cash  flows generated  by fixed farm  assets.  The  levels of the interest rate and gross cash farm income
higher DSI index  can be  achieved  through  an  in-  index are illustrated in Figures  1 and 2. In Figure  1
crease in the noncurrent liabilities/noncurrent assets  the post-restructure  interest rate (INT)  is varied  as
ratio, or through a reduction of the total liabilities/to-  the  DSI,  DA,  and GCFI  indices  are  held at their
tal assets ratio,  or through a combination  of these  mean values.  When the interest  rate is raised from
financial structure adjustments.  the mean (9.18) percent to 10.28 percent (one stand-
The  accounting  definition  of the  DSI  measure  ard deviation higher) the probability of nonperform-
indicates that the DSI and DA variables are inversely  ance rises from 9 percent to over 25  percent. This
related.  However,  the actual extent of that inverse  increase  in nonperformance  is  significant  but  re-
relationship  depended  on the degree  of statistical  flects the rate of response in a relatively flat section
correlation found  in the sample farm data set.  The  of the cumulative probability curve.  Since the rela-
correlation  coefficient  between  the  DSI  and  DA  tionship is nonlinear, larger increases in the interest
index variables was found to be low (-0.19). Hence,  ate  imply proportionately  larger  increases  in the
to isolate the differential effects of long-term liquid-  rate  of default.  The  corresponding  effects  of im-
ity and financial structure, the DA variable was also  provements in farm income on loan performance are
included  in the model.  This  improved  the overall  illustrated  in Figure  2 by  varying  the GCFI index
significance  of the variables  and separated  the  ef-  while  holding  INT,  DSI,  and  DA  at  their  mean
fects of debt structure from leverage on loan nonper-  values.  When  the GCFI  index  is  set at 0.78  (one
formance.  The DA index variable has the expected  standard deviation below its mean) the probability
positive sign but is not highly significant. The higher  that  the restructured  loan  would  not  perform  in-
the debt/asset index,  the higher the probability that  creases from about 9 percent to over 33 percent.
the loan will not perform.  The  impact of a change  in  any one of the inde-
As expected,  the gross cash farm income (GCFI)  pendent variables on the conditional probability  of
index had a negative sign in the model.  The higher  nonperformance  can  be  assessed  using  marginal
the level  of gross  cash farm income  in the post-re-  analysis. However, it is to be noted that the marginal
structure period,  the lower the probability  that the  effect is not constant because of the logistic distri-
borrower would default.  An improvement  in a bor-  bution  of  the  error  term.  The  marginal  effect  is
rower's  post-restructure  gross  cash  farm  income  calculated  at the overall mean values  of the other
situation was interpreted  as an increase  in the debt  independent  variables.  The  marginal  effect  is  the
repayment capacity of the borrower's farm business.  change in the conditional probability of  nonperform-
The  coefficient  on  the  GCFI  index  variable  was  ance associated  with  a one  percent change  in the
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Figure  2.  Effect of Gross Cash  Farm  Income  on Loan Nonperformance
45the remaining  independent variables  at their mean  largest effect in controlling performance of the post-
values. The results are presented in Table 3.  restructure  loan portfolio.
The post-restructure  interest  rate  had the largest  Two  characteristics  of  these  critical  points  are
marginal  effect  on  the  conditional  probability  of  notable. First, when all four variables are jointly set
nonperformance.  The marginal  effect  was 0.87.  A  at their critical values they define an extremely high
one percent upward adjustment in the post-restruc-  percentage  of nonperformance.  This  high level of
ture interest rate from its mean (9.18 percent) to 9.27  nonperformance  can readily be seen by comparing
percent is associated with a 0.87 percent increase in  the critical point values with the mean statistics in
the conditional  probability  of  nonperformance  of  Table  3.  A loan  characterized  by  all  four  critical
restructured  loans.  The  analogous  effect  could  be  points  would carry  a higher-than-average  post-re-
shown for a decrease in the interest rate.  A similar  structure  interest  rate,  a  lower-than-average  debt
interpretation applies to the DSI index except that a  structure index, a significantly greater financial lev-
1.0 percent  increase  (decrease)  in  the  DSI  index  erage position than the average, and a sharply lower-
reduces  (increases)  the  conditional  probability  of  than-average level of gross cash farm income. Based
nonperformance  by 0.7  percent.  The  GCFI  index  on signs of  the estimated coefficients in Table 2, each
and the  DA index  variables  have  correspondingly  of  these critical  point  variations  from  the sample
smaller influences on the probability of nonperform-  means contributes  to a higher rate of nonperform-
ance, as suggested by their smaller marginal coeffi-  ance.  Clearly,  the FCB could improve overall loan
cients.  performance by managing the restructure process to
avoid positioning borrowers at levels of the determi-
Table 3.  Marginal  Effects,  Means and Critical  nants which  are  simultaneously  equal  to the  four
Points for the Independent Variables  critical points. This characteristic  of critical points
Independent  Marginal  Critical  also  suggests  that  a range  of trade-offs may  exist
Variable  Effect  Mean  Point  among the identified factors when banks undertake
INT (%)a  0.87  9.18  11.25  individual  loan restructuring.  Second, the post-re-
DSI  (indeX)b  -0.70  1.04  0.76  structure  interest  rate represents  a policy  variable
I  (index)  -0.  1.0  0.6  that the FCB could use to influence the performance
GCFI  (index)  -0.52  1.05  0.66  of its restructured  loans.  The  other predictor  vari-
DA (index)d  0.22  .85  1.58  ables  are  exogenous  to  the  FCB.  Therefore,  the
aPost-restructure  interest rate.  critical-point  concept  is  analyzed  in  terms  of the
b Debt structure index.  trade-off between projections  about changes in the c  Gross cash farm  income. 
d  Debt/asset ratio.  level of gross cash farm income and the post-restruc-
ture interest rate which the FCB could set to achieve
a level of nonperformance  that is both financially
feasible and acceptable.
Critical Point Analysis For illustration, the 9 percent level of nonperform-
A critical point on the logistic curve is the location  ance predicted  by  the model  (at the means of the
at which changes in the probability of nonperform-  variables)  is assumed  to be financially  sustainable
ance are the greatest (i.e.,  slope is the steepest).  As  by,  and  acceptable  to,  the FCB. Various  levels  of
one moves away from this point, the probability that  gross cash farm income are assumed due to uncer-
restructured  loans  would not perform changes less  tainty about farm prices and/or yields. The resulting
dramatically.  This value is estimated by solving the  GCFI indices are  varied between  a 30 percent  im-
model in Table 2  with pTXi =0 for the value of the  provement  and  a  30  percent  deterioration  (while
i-th variable (in Equation 6) while holding all other  holding the DSI index and DA index at their sample
variables  at their mean values,  means) to simulate the problem (Table 4). Note also
The critical  value of INT is 11.25 percent.  At that  that the base projection for the GCFI index is 1.05,
interest rate level the conditional probability of non-  which corresponds with the mean 5 percent increase
performance  is  50  percent.  This  is  illustrated  in  in gross cash farm income found in the sample. To
Figure  1. As  the post-restructure  interest  rate  ap-  maintain a 9 percent level of expected nonperform-
proaches  11.25 percent, the interest rate achieves its  ance, the FCB would need to reduce the interest rate
maximum impact on the probability of nonperform-  on restructured  loans to  offset the effects  of lower
ance.  Similar critical values are reported in Table 3  projected  cash  farm  income.  A  10  percent  lower
for the other variables  in the model.  These critical  projected  GCFI  (which  reduces  the  GCFI  index
points  represent  values  of individual  variables  at  from  1.05  to 0.95)  would imply  a decrease  in the
which FCS restructuring  actions would achieve the  interest rate from 9.18 percent to 8.63 percent. Con-
46Table 4.  Relationship  Between the Projected GCFI  thepost-restructureinterestratewashigher,  thelevel
Index and the Post-Restructure  Interest  of borrower gross cash farm income was lower, the
Rate  debt structure index was lower, and financial lever-
age was higher in the post-restructure period. How-
ChPrectedn  I  Implied  Interest  ever,  the empirical  analysis  also shows  that these
Index  GCFIa  Rate  factors  were  not equally  important,  and  that  the
(%)  Index  (%)  probability effects of these factors are not linear. For
-30  0.735  7.45  example, the post-restructure interest rate was found
-20  0.840  8.03  to be a relatively more important predictor  of loan
~-10  0.950  ~~8.63  ~  performance than the other variables in the model. -10  0.950  8.63
The probability  of loan nonperformance  was also
-5  1.000  8.90 5  1 .000o  8.90  shown to vary in a nonlinear fashion as interest rates
0 (base)  1.050  9.18  and other  determinants  were allowed to vary.  Sig-
5  1.1025  9.46  nificance of the interest rate, cash farm income, debt
10  1.155  9.76  structure and total financial leverage variables in the
20  1.260  10.34  model  indicated  that  restructured  loans  remained
30  1.365  10.91  ohighly  sensitive to factors which determine the debt
repayment burden and the repayment  ability of the Gross cash farm  income. restructured farm operations.
These  results  suggest  factors  which  the  Farm
versely, a  10 percent improvement  in the projected  Credit Banks  and other  agricultural  lenders might
GCFI  index  variable  (from  1.05  to  1.155)  would  consider to achieve a desired level of performance
allow the FCB to restructure nonperforming loans at  on restructured loans. Furthermore, marginal analy-
a 9.76 percent rate and still maintain the target rate  sis indicates  that interest rates could be adjusted to
of loan  nonperformance.  In  this  way  the  FCB's  offset changes in projected farm income and main-
interest rate policy  could  become  a more integral  tain farm loan performance  at an acceptable  level.
part of its strategic plan for restructuring  nonaccrual  Since only one year of information was available for
loans.  the  analysis,  the  determinants  we  identify  apply
SUMMARY  . primarily  to  the  short-rnm  performance  of  these
loans.  Other factors may also be important in deter-
A binomial  logit  analysis  was  developed  using  mining long term performance of these loans.  This
cross-sectional data to estimate the probability  that  becomes  relatively  more  important  as  the  Farm
a restructured  loan would not perform  during  the  Credit Bank considers raising restructured loan in-
post-restructure period. Not surprisingly, the analy-  terest rates to levels that are consistent with rates on
sis  of post-restructure  performance  indicated  that  other accruing loans in its portfolio and as financial
loans had a higher probability  of not performing  if  and income conditions in agriculture change.
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